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Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between generalization and privacy preservation in iterative
learning algorithms by two sequential steps. We first establish the generalization-privacy relationship for
any learning algorithm. We prove that (ε, δ)-differential privacy implies an on-average generalization
bound for multi-database learning algorithms which further leads to a high-probability generalization
bound. The high-probability generalization bound implies a PAC-learnable guarantee for differentially
private algorithms. We then investigate how the iterative nature would influence the generalizability and
privacy. Three new composition theorems are proposed to approximate the (ε′, δ′)-differential privacy
of any iterative algorithm through the differential privacy of its every iteration. By integrating the above
two steps, we deliver two generalization bounds for iterative learning algorithms, which characterize
how privacy-preserving ability guarantees generalizability and how the iterative nature contributes to
the generalization-privacy relationship. All the theoretical results are strictly tighter than the existing
results in the literature and do not explicitly rely on the model size which can be prohibitively large in
deep models. The theories directly apply to a wide spectrum of learning algorithms. In this paper, we
take stochastic gradient Langevin dynamics and the agnostic federated learning from the client view for
examples to show one can simultaneously enhance privacy preservation and generalizability through the
proposed theories.
Keywords: learning theory, differential privacy, generalization.
1 Introduction
Generalization to unseen data and privacy preservation are two increasingly important facets of machine
learning. Specifically, good generalization guarantees that an algorithm learns the underlying patterns
in training data rather than just memorize the data [71, 53]. In this way, good generalization abilities
provide confidence that the models trained on existing data can be applied to similar but unseen scenarios.
Additionally, massive personal data has been collected, such as financial and medical records. How to
discover the highly valuable population knowledge in the data while protecting the highly sensitive
individual privacy has profound importance [22, 23, 62].
This paper investigates the relationship between generalization and privacy for iterative machine
learning algorithms by the following two steps: (1) exploring the relationship between generalization and
privacy for any learning algorithm; and (2) analyzing how the iterative nature shared by most learning
algorithms would influence the generalization-privacy relationship.
We first prove two theorems that upper bound the generalization error via its differential privacy.
Specifically, we prove a high-probability generalization bound that characterizes the cumulative distribu-
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tion function of the generalization error,
R(A(S)) − RˆS(A(S)),
where A(S) is the hypothesis learned by algorithm A on dataset S, R(A(S)) is the expected risk, and
RˆS(A(S)) is the empirical risk. This bound is established based on a novel on-average generaliza-
tion bound for any (ε, δ)-differentially private multi-database learning algorithm. Our high-probability
generalization bound implies that differentially private machine learning algorithms are probably approx-
imately correct (PAC)-learnable. These two generalization bounds indicate that the algorithms with a
good privacy-preserving ability also have good generalizability. We, therefore, can expect to innovate
algorithms to approach better generalization performance by enhancing the privacy-preserving ability.
We then studied how the iterative nature influences the generalization-privacyrelationship. Generally,
the privacy-preservingability of an iterative algorithmdegenerates alongwith iterations, since the amount
of leaked informationcumulateswhen the algorithm is progressing. To capture this degenerativeproperty,
we further prove three composition theorems that calculate the differential privacy of any iterative
algorithm via the differential privacy of its iterations. By combining Theorem 1 with the composition
theorems, we can establish the generalization-privacy relationship for iterative learning algorithms.
Our results considerably extend the current understanding of the generalization-privacy relationship.
Some works [21, 58, 59] prove some high-probability generalization bounds in the form as below,
P
[
R(A(S)) − RˆS(A(S)) > a
]
< b.
Among them, the current tightest generalization bounds are obtained by Nissim and Stemmer [58].
Our high-probability bound is strictly tighter than the current best results. Besides, we prove the first
PAC-learnable guarantee for differentially private machine learning algorithms via our high-probability
generalization bound. Nissim and Stemmer also prove an on-average multi-database generalization
bound. Our bound also tightens it by a factor of eε, which would be considerably large in practice. Also,
the bounds in [58] are only for binary classification, while ours apply to any differentially private learning
algorithm. Some works have also proved composition theorems [23, 36]. The approximation of factor δ
in our composition theorem is tighter than the tightest existing result by the following factor,
δ
eε − 1
eε + 1
(
T −
⌈
ε′
ε
⌉)
,
for T iterations, while the estimate of ε′ remains the same [36]. Our composition theorems can consid-
erably tighten our generalization bounds for iterative learning algorithms because the term b is directly
proportional to δ.
Our theories apply to a wide spectrum of machine learning algorithms. This paper applies them to
stochastic gradient Langevin dynamics [75] as an example of stochastic gradient Markov chain Monte
Carlo [47], and the agnostic federated learning from the client view [28]. Our theories help deliver an
on-average generalization bounds and a high-probability generalization bounds for SGLD and agnos-
tic federated learning. Furthermore, the obtained generalization bounds do not explicitly rely on the
model size, which can be prohibitively large in modern methods, such as deep neural networks. These
implementations are natural but technically non-trivial.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related works of generalization,
differential privacy, and algorithmic stability. Section 3 defines notations and recall preliminaries. Section
4 provides main results: specifically, Section 4.1 establishes the relationships between generalizability
and privacy preservation, sketches the proofs wherein, and compares existing results with ours; and
Section 4.2 establishes the degenerative nature of differential privacy in iterative algorithms, sketches
the proofs wherein, and compares existing results with ours. Section 5 applies our theories to stochastic
gradient Langevin dynamics (Section 5.1) and agnostic federated learning (Section 5.2). Section 6
concludes this paper.
2
2 Background
Generalization bound is a standard measurement of the generalization ability, which is defined as the
upper bound of the difference between the expected risk and the empirical risk [56, 71, 53]. Since the
two risks can be treated as the training error and the expectation of the test error, generalization bound
expresses the gap between the performance on existing data and the performance on unknown data.
Therefore, we can expect an algorithm with a small generalization bound to generalize well. Existing
generalization bounds are mainly obtained from three stems: (1) concentration inequalities derive many
high-probability generalization bounds based on the hypothesis complexity, such as VC dimension
[9, 70], Rademacher complexity [39, 38, 6], and covering number [19, 32]. These generalization bounds
suggest implementations consistent with the principle of Occam’s razor that controls the hypothesis
complexity to help models generalize better; (2) some on-average and high-probability generalization
bounds are proved based on the algorithmic stability to the disturbance in the training sample set [65, 11],
following an intuition that an algorithm with good generalization ability is insensitive to the disturbance
in individual data points; and (3) under the PAC-Bayes framework [49, 50], generalization bounds are
established on information-theoretical distances between the output hypothesis and the prior, such as
KL divergence and mutual information. As an over-parameterized model, deep learning demonstrates
excellent generalizability, which is somehow beyond the explanation of the existing statistical learning
theory and thus attracts the community’ interests. Recent advances in deep learning theory include
generalization bounds via VC dimension [5], Rademacher complexity [29, 4], covering number [4],
Fisher-Rao norm [44, 68], PAC-Bayesian framework [57], algorithmic stability [30, 42, 72], and via the
dynamics of stochastic gradient descent or its variant [48, 55, 33] driven by the loss surface. A major
difficulty wherein is the prohibitively complicated nature of the loss surfaces, which, however, exactly
characterizes deep learning’s behavior [34].
Differential privacy measures an algorithm according to its privacy-preserving ability [23, 20].
Specifically, (ε, δ)-differential privacy is defined as the change in output hypothesis when the algorithm
A is exposed to attacks as follows,
log
[
PA(S)(A(S) ∈ B)− δ
PA(S′)(A(S′) ∈ B)
]
≤ ε,
where B is an arbitrary subset of the hypothesis space and (S, S′) is a neighboring sample set pair in
which S and S′ only differ by one example. Therefore, an algorithmwith small differential privacy (ε, δ)
robust to changes in individual training examples. Thus, the magnitude of differential privacy (ε, δ)
indexes the ability to resist differential attacks that uses fake sample points as probes to attack machine
learning algorithms, and then infer the individual privacy via the changes of output hypotheses. Many
variants of differential privacy have been designed bymodifying the division operation: (1) concentration
differential privacy assumes that the privacy loss defined as below,
log
[
PA(S)(A(S) ∈ B)
PA(S′)(A(S′) ∈ B)
]
,
is sub-Gaussian [24, 12]; (2) mutual-information differential privacy and KL differential privacy adapt
mutual information and KL divergence, respectively, to measure changes of the hypotheses [15, 73, 45,
13]; (3) Rényi differential privacy further replaces the KL divergence by Rényi divergence [52, 27]; etc.
As a game-changer, deep learning has reshaped machine learning and become a major player in many
areas. Its privacy-preserving ability is thus of much interest [1, 3].
Algorithmic stability measures how stable an algorithm is when the training sample is exposed to
disturbance [65, 37, 11, 76, 69]. It is defined as the change to the output hypothesis when a single
training example is disturbed. The change is measured according to the distances or pseudo-distances in
the hypothesis space H or its variants [16]; for example, (1) hypothesis stability measures the changes
based on the L1 norm on the composited space l ◦ H (l is the loss function) [11]; (2) uniform stability
is defined based on the L∞ norm on l ◦ H [11]; (3) error stability further calculates the expectation of
the uniform stability with respect to the randomness in the sample set [11]; (4) TV stability measures the
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change according to the difference in probability:
sup
R
|P(A(S) ∈ R)− P(A(S′) ∈ R)|,
where R is a subset of the hypothesis space H [7]; and (5) KL stability measures the change by the
KL divergence [7]. In the context of model over-parameterized machine learning models, algorithmic
stability shed lights to understanding their success [30, 42, 72].
These definitions of algorithmic stability provide a naturalway to bridge generalization and differential
privacy. Some works have connected generalization with algorithmic stability. For example, [11]
presented polynomial high-probability generalization bounds via hypothesis stability and exponential
high-probability generalization bounds via uniform stability. Furthermore, algorithmic stability and
differential privacy measure almost the same object from different aspects. Specifically, algorithmic
stability measures the change in the output hypothesis when the training sample is disturbed by the
subtraction operation, while differential privacy measures the same change by the division operation.
Given this similarity, some papers have even treated differential privacy as algorithmic stability; for
example, [7] called differential privacy and KL differential privacy as max-KL stability and KL stability,
respectively.
3 Notations and Preliminaries
Suppose S = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xN , yN)|Xi ∈ X ⊂ RdX , Yi ∈ Y ⊂ RdY , i = 1, . . . , N} is a training
sample set, dX and dY are the dimensions of the featureX and the label Y , respectively. For the brevity,
we define zi = (xi, yi). All zi are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) observations of the
variable,
Z = (X,Y ) ∈ Z, Z ∼ D,
where D is the data distribution.
A machine learning algorithmA learns a hypothesis,
A(S) ∈ H ⊂ YX = {f : X → Y},
from the training sample S ∈ ZN . The expected risk R(A(S)) and empirical risk Rˆ(A(S)) of the
algorithmA are defined as follows,
R(A(S)) = EZ l(A(S), Z),
RˆS(A(S)) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
l(A(S), zi),
where l : H×Z → R+ is the loss function. It worths noting that both the algorithmA and the training
sample set S can introduce randomness in the expected riskR(A(S)) and empirical risk Rˆ(A(S)).
The generalization error is defined as the difference between the expected risk and empirical risk,
RˆS(A(S))−R(A(S)),
whose upper bound is called the generalization bound.
Privacy-preserving ability is important to machine learning. Differential privacymeasures the ability
to preserve privacy. Differential privacy is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy; cf. [23]). A stochastic algorithm A is called (ε, δ)-differentially
private if for any subset B ⊂ H and any neighboring sample set pair S and S′ which are different by
only one example, we have
log
[
PA(S)(A(S) ∈ B)− δ
PA(S′)(A(S′) ∈ B)
]
≤ ε.
The algorithmA is also called ε-differentially private, if it is (ε, 0)-differentially private.
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Algorithmic stability measures a machine learning algorithm according to the stability of its output
hypothesis when the training sample set is disturbed [11]. While algorithmic stability has many different
definitions, this paper mainly discusses uniform stability.
Definition 2 (Uniform stability; cf. [11]). A machine learning algorithm A is uniformly stable, if for
any neighboring sample pair S and S′ which are different by only one example, we have the following
inequality, ∣∣EA(S)l(A(S), Z)− EA(S′)l(A(S′), Z)∣∣ ≤ β,
where Z is an arbitrary example,A(S) andA(S′) are the output hypotheses learned on the training sets
S and S′, respectively, and β is a positive real constant. The constant β is called the uniform stability of
the algorithmA.
4 Generalization Bounds for Iterative Differentially Private Algo-
rithms
This section analyses the generalizability of iterative differentially private algorithms. The establish-
ment has two steps. We first establish the generalization-privacy relationship for any machine learning
algorithm. Then, we investigate how the iterative nature shared by most algorithms would influence the
differential privacy by delivering three novel composition theorems. The two stages collectively establish
the generalizability of iterative differentially private algorithms.
4.1 Bridging Generalization and Privacy
We prove a high-probability generalization bound for any (ε, δ)-differentially private machine learning
algorithm.
Theorem 1 (High-Probability Generalization Bound via Differential Privacy). Suppose algorithm A is
(ε, δ)-differentially private, the training sample size,
N ≥ 2
ε2
ln
(
16
e−εδ
)
,
and the loss function ‖l‖∞ ≤ 1. Then, for any distribution D over Z , we have
P
[∣∣∣RˆS(A(S)) −R(A(S))∣∣∣ < 9ε] > 1− e−εδ
ε
ln
(
2
ε
)
.
This high-probability generalization bound characterizes how the cumulative distribution function of
the generalization error RˆS(A(S)) − R(A(S)). This bound demonstrates that the privacy-preserving
ability implies generalizability. Thus, we can unify the algorithm design for enhancing privacy preser-
vation and for improving generalization.
Theorem1 implies that (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithms are also probably approximately correct
(PAC)-learnable, which is the first in the literature. PAC-learnability is defined as below,
Definition 3 (PAC-learnability). A concept class C is said to be PAC-learnable if there exists an algorithm
A and a polynomial function poly(·, ·, ·, ·) such that for any s > 0 and t > 0, for all distributions D on
the training example Z , any target concept c ∈ C, and any sample size
m ≥ poly(1/s, 1/t, n, size(C)),
the following holds,
PS∼Dm(R(A(S)) < s) > 1− t. (1)
In Section 5, we prove the PAC-learnability for stochastic gradient Langevin dynamics (SGLD) as
an example of the Gaussian mechanism. The PAC-learnable guarantee for the Laplacian mechanism,
another major stream of privacy-preserving algorithms, can be similarly obtained.
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4.1.1 Proof Skeleton
Theorems 1 is established on a novel on-average generalization bound for multi-database algorithms.
Suppose the training sample S is separated to k i.i.d. sub-databases S1, . . . , Sk. For the brevity, we write
the training sample set as below
~S = (S1, . . . , Sk).
Correspondingly, the output of a multi-database algorithm A˜ is a pair as follows,
(hA(~S), iA(~S)) ∈ H× {1, . . . , k}.
Theorem 2 (On-Average Multi-Database Generalization Bound). Let algorithm as follows,
A˜ : ~S → H× {1, · · · , k},
is (ε, δ)-differentially private and the loss function ‖l‖∞ ≤ 1. Then, for any distribution D over Z , we
have ∣∣∣∣∣ E~S∼DN
[
E
A(~S)
[
RˆSi
A(~S)
(
hA(~S)
)]
− E
A(~S)
[
R
(
hA(~S)
)]]∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ e−εkδ + 1− e−ε. (2)
Since 1− e−ε ≤ ε, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Suppose all the condition in Theorem 2 holds, then
E
~S∼DkN
[
E
A(~S)
[
RˆSi
A(~S)
(hA(~S))
]]
≤ e−εkδ + ε+ E
~S∼DkN
[
E
A(~S)
[
R
(
hA(~S)
)]]
.
Markov bound (cf. [53], Theorem C.1) is an important concentration inequality in learning theory.
Here, we slightly modify the original version as follows,
Ex [h(x)] ≥ Ex
[
h(x)Ih(x)≥g(x)
] ≥ Ex [g(x)Ih(x)≥g(x)] .
Then, combining it with Theorem 2, we derive the following high probability generalization bound
for multi-database algorithms.
Lemma 1. Let algorithm A : ZkN → YX × {1, · · · , k} have (ε, δ) differential privacy. Let A(~S) =
(hA(~S), iA(~S)). Then, for any distribution D over Z , any database set ~S = {Si}ki=1 where Si is a
database containsN i.i.d. sample from D, we have
P
[
RˆSi
A(~S)
(hA(~S)) ≤ R
(
hA(~S)
)
+ ke−εδ + 3ε
]
≥ ε.
We eventually proveTheorem1 byReduction to Absurdity. Assume there exists an algorithmAwhich
conflicts with Theorem 1. We can then construct an algorithm B based on the exponential mechanism
which is defined as follows.
Definition 4 (ExponentialMechanism). The exponential mechanism q(S, u,R, ε) selects and outputs an
element r ∈ R with probability proportional to exp
(
εu(x,r)
2∆u
)
, where u(S, r) is the utility function and
∆u is the sensitivity of u defined by
∆u
∆
= max
r∈R
max
S,S′ adjacent
|u(S, r) − u(S′, r)|.
Specifically, we let the input be ~S = (S1, · · · , Sk) and T , where Si, T ∈ ZN . We then run the
exponential mechanism with utility function as follows,
u(~S, T, i) = NRˆSi(A(Si))−NRˆT (A(Si)).
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We can prove B is (2ε, δ)-DP and
P
[
RˆSi
B(~S)
(
hB(~S)
)
≤ R
(
hB(~S)
)
+ ke−εδ + 6ε
]
< ε,
which then leads to Theorem 1.
This is summarized as the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let algorithm A : ZN → RZ , k = εe−εδ , and
N ≥ 2
ε2
ln
(
16
e−εδ
)
.
If algorithmA and distributionD over sample space Z satisfy
P
[
Rˆ(A(S)) ≤ e−εkδ + 8ǫ+R(A(S))
]
< 1− e
−εδ
ε
ln
(
2
ǫ
)
,
then there exists an algorithm
B : ZkN → RZ × {1, · · · , k},
is (2ε, δ)-differentially private and
P
[
RˆSi
B(~S)
(
hB(~S)
)
≤ R
(
hB(~S)
)
+ ke−εδ + 6ε
]
< ε,
where ~S = {Si}ki=1 and Si is a database containsN i.i.d. sample from D.
4.1.2 Comparison with Existing Results
Comparison for Theorem 1. There have been several high-probability generalization bounds for
(ε, δ)-differentially private machine learning algorithms. Dwork et al. [21] prove that
P
[
R(A(S)) − RˆS(A(S)) < 4ε
]
> 1− 8δε.
Oneto et al. [59] prove that
P
[
DiffR <
√
6RˆS(A(S))εˆ+ 6
(
ε2 + 1/N
)]
> 1− 3e−Nε2 ,
and
P
[
DiffR <
√
4VˆS(A(S))εˆ+ 5N
N − 1
(
ε2 + 1/N
)]
> 1− 3e−Nε2,
where
DiffR = R(A(S))− RˆS(A(S)),
εˆ = ε+
√
1/N,
VˆS(A(S)) = 1
2N(N − 1)
∑
i6=j
[ℓ (A(S), zi)− ℓ (A(S), zj)]2 .
It is worth noting that VˆS(A(S)) is the empirical variance of l(A(S), ·) (see [59], Lemmas 3 and 5,
respectively).
The existing tightest high-probability generalization bound in the literature is obtained by Nissim and
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Stemmer [58] as follows
P
[
R(A(S)) − RˆS(A(S)) < 13ε
]
> 1− 2δ
ε
log
(
2
ε
)
.
However, this bound only stands for binary classification problem. By contrast, our high-probability
generalization bound holds for any machine learning algorithm.
Also, our bound is strictly tighter than the existing results. All the bounds, including ours, are in the
following form,
P
[
R(A(S))− RˆS(A(S)) < a
]
> 1− b.
Apparently, a smaller a and a smaller b imply a tighter generalization bound. Thus, our bound improves
the current tightest result from two aspects: (1) our bound tightens the term a from 13ε to 9ε; and (2) it
tightens the term b from 2δε log
(
2
ε
)
to 2e
−εδ
ε log
(
2
ε
)
.
Recently, Jung et al. [35] recently defined two new measures to evaluate the generalizability, i.e.,
in-sample accuracy and distributional accuracy, upon which it also developed the privacy-generalization
relationship. Specifically, it proves high-probability bounds on the distributional accuracy of any mech-
anism that is both differentially private and has a bounded in-sample accuracy. It is an interesting open
problem to discover the linkage of the conventional generalization error with the in-sample accuracy and
the out-of-sample accuracy.
Comparison for Theorem 2. There is only one related work in the literature that presents an
on-average generalization bound for multi-database algorithm [58] as follows,∣∣∣∣∣ E~S∼DkN
[
E
A(~S)
[
RˆSi
A(~S)
(hA(~S))
]
− E
A(~S)
[
R
(
hA(~S)
)]]∣∣∣∣∣
≤ kδ + 2ε.
Our bound is tighter by a factor of eε. Furthermore, the result in [58] stands only for binary classification,
while our result apply to all differentially private learning algorithms.
4.2 How the Iterative Nature Contributes?
Most machine learning algorithms are iterative, which may degenerate the privacy-preserving ability
along with iterations. This section studies the degenerative nature of the generalization-privacy relation-
ship in iterative machine learning algorithms. Detailed proofs are given in Appendix B.
Suppose an iterative machine learning algorithmA has n steps: {Yi(S)}Ti=0, where Yi is the learned
hypothesis after the i-th iteration. Also, we define the i-th iterator as below,
Mi : (Yi−1(S), S) 7→ Yi(S).
Additionally, we assume that the initial hypothesis h0 is independent with the sample S.
Then, we have the following composition theorem.
Theorem 3 (Composition Theorem I). Suppose an iterative machine learning algorithmA has T steps:
{Yi(S)}Ti=0, where Yi is the learned hypothesis after the i-th iteration. Suppose the i-th iterator
Mi : (Yi−1, S) 7→ Yi
is (ε, δ)-differentially private. Then, the algorithm A is (ε′, δ′)-differentially private. The factor ε′ is as
follows,
ε′ = min {ε′1, ε′2, ε′3} , (3)
where
ε′1 =
T∑
i=1
εi, (4)
ε′2 =
T∑
i=1
(eεi − 1) εi
eεi + 1
+
√√√√√2 T∑
i=1
ε2i log

e+
√∑T
i=1 ε
2
i
δ˜

,
ε′3 =
T∑
i=1
(eεi − 1) εi
eεi + 1
+
√√√√2 log(1
δ˜
) T∑
i=1
ε2i , (5)
and δ˜ is an arbitrary positive real constant.
Correspondingly, the factor δ′ is defined as the maximal value of the following equation with respect
to {αi}Ti=1 ∈ I ,
1−
T∏
i=1
(
1− eαi δi
1 + eεi
)
+ 1−
T∏
i=1
(
1− δi
1 + eεi
)
+ δ˜, (6)
where
I =
{
{αi}Ti=1 :
T∑
i=1
αi = ε
′, |{i : αi 6= εi, αi 6= 0}| ≤ 1
}
,
and δ˜ is the same real constant mentioned above.
When all the iterations have the same privacy-preserving ability, we can tighten the approximation of
the factor δ′ as the following corollary.
Corollary 2 (Composition Theorem II). When all the iterations are (ε, δ)-differential private, δ′ is
δ′ =1−
(
1− eε δ
1 + eε
)⌈ ε′
ε
⌉(
1− δ
1 + eε
)T−⌈ ε′
ε
⌉
+ 1−
(
1− δ
1 + eε
)T
+ δ˜
=
(
T −
⌈
ε′
ε
⌉)
2δ
1 + eε
+
⌈
ε′
ε
⌉
δ + δ˜ +O
((
δ
1 + eε
)2)
.
Proof. The maximum of δ′ is achieved when at most T −
⌈
ε′
ε
⌉
elements αi 6= 0. Since (1 − x)n =
1− nx+O(x2), the δ′ in Theorem 3 can be estimated as
δ′ =1−
(
1− eε δ
1 + eε
)⌈ ε′
ε
⌉(
1− δ
1 + eε
)T−⌈ ε′
ε
⌉
+ 1−
(
1− δ
1 + eε
)T
+ δ˜
=1 + T
δ
1 + eε
+ δ˜ +O
((
δ
1 + eε
)2)
−
(
1−
⌈
ε′
ε
⌉
δ
1 + eε
+O
((
δ
1 + eε
)2))(
1−
(
T −
⌈
ε′
ε
⌉)
δ
1 + eε
+O
((
δ
1 + eε
)2))
=
⌈
ε′
ε
⌉
δ
1 + eε
+
(
T −
⌈
ε′
ε
⌉)
δ
1 + eε
+O
((
δ
1 + eε
)2)
+ T
δ
1 + eε
+ δ˜ +O
((
δ
1 + eε
)2)
≈
(
T −
⌈
ε′
ε
⌉)
2δ
1 + eε
+
⌈
ε′
ε
⌉
δ + δ˜.
The proof is completed.
When all the iteratorsMi are ε-differentially private, we can further tighten the third estimation of ε
′
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in Theorem 3, eq. (3) as the following composition theorem.
Corollary 3 (Composition Theorem III). Suppose all the iteratorsMi are ε-differentially private and all
the other conditions in Theorem 3 hold. Then, the algorithmA is (ε′, δ′)-differentially private that
ε′ =T
(eε − 1) ε
eε + 1
+
√
2 log
(
1
δ˜
)
Tε2,
δ′ =1−
(
1− eε δ
1 + eε
)⌈ ε′
ε
⌉(
1− δ
1 + eε
)T−⌈ ε′
ε
⌉
+ 1−
(
1− δ
1 + eε
)T
+ δ′′,
where δ′′ is defined as follows:
δ′′ = e−
ε
′+Tε
2
(
1
1 + eε
(
2Tε
Tε− ε′
))T (
Tε+ ε′
Tε− ε′
)− ε′+Tε2ε
.
Remark 1. The three composition theorems extend the developed generalization-privacy relationship
to iterative machine learning algorithms. At this point, we establish the theoretical foundation for the
generalization-privacy relationship for iterative differentially private learning algorithms.
4.2.1 Proof Skeleton
Differential privacy measures the distance between the hypotheses learned from neighboring training
sample sets which are different by only one single example. It is worth noting that three additional
composition theorems are proposed in this section which is, however, weaker than our main results, the
aforementioned three.
To approach the differential privacy of an iterative learning algorithm from the differential privacy
of every iteration directly would be technically difficult. In this paper, we employ KL divergence as a
bridge to relive the technical difficulty, which is defined as follows.
Definition 5 (KL Divergence; cf. [41]). Suppose two distributions P and Q are defined on the same
support. Then the KL divergence betweenQ and P is defined by
DKL(P‖Q) = EP
(
log
dP
dQ
)
.
Here, we confuse the notations of distribution and its cumulative distribution unction.
For any ε-differentially private learning algorithm, we prove the following lemma to approximate the
KL-divergence between hypotheses learned on neighboring training sample sets.
Lemma 3. If A : X → Y is a ε-differentially private algorithm , then for every neighbor database (or
sample set) S and S′, the KL divergence of A(S) and A(S′) satisfies
DKL(A(S)‖A(S′)) ≤ εe
ε − 1
eε + 1
.
This lemma is novel and the proof is technically non-trivial. There are two related results in the
literature, which are however looser than ours. Dwork et al. [25] proved an inequality of the KL
divergence as follows,
DKL(A(S)‖A(S′)) ≤ ε(eε − 1).
Then, Dwork and Rothblum [24] pushed the upper bound to
DKL(A(S)‖A(S′)) ≤ 1
2
ε(eε − 1). (7)
Compared with ours, eq. (7) is larger by a factor (1 + eε)/2, which can be very large in practice.
We then recall several lemmas necessary to the proof of our composition theorems.
10
Azuma Lemma [10] which derives an upper bound based on a concentration probability of martin-
gales.
Lemma 4 (Azuma Lemma; cf. [53], p. 371). Suppose {Yi}Ti=1 is a sequence of random variables that
Yi ∈ [−ai, ai]. Also, suppose {Xi}Ti=1 is a sequence of random variables such that
E(Yi|Xi−1, ..., X1) ≤ Ci,
where {Ci}Ti=1 is a sequence of constant reals. Then, we have the following upper bound of the sum of Yi
P

 T∑
i=1
Yi ≥
T∑
i=1
Ci + t
√√√√ T∑
i=1
a2i

 ≤ e− t22
Lemma 5 (cf. [24], Lemmas 3.9 and 3.10). For any two distributionsD andD′, there exist distributions
M andM ′ such that
max{D∞(M‖M ′), D∞(M ′‖M)} = max{D∞(D‖D′), D∞(D′‖D)}
and
DKL(D‖D′) ≤ DKL(M‖M ′) = DKL(M ′‖M).
Lemma 6 (cf. [23], Theorem 3.17). We have that
Dδ∞(Y ‖Z) ≤ ε, Dδ∞(Z‖Y ) ≤ ε,
if and only if there exist random variables Y ′, Z ′ such that
∆(Y ‖Y ′) ≤ δ
eε + 1
, ∆(Z‖Z ′) ≤ δ
1 + eε
,
D∞(Y ′‖Z ′) ≤ ε, D∞(Z ′‖Y ′) ≤ ε.
Based on Lemma 5, we proved the following lemma that illustrates that the maximum of f is achieved
when {αi}Ti=1 are at the boundary and will be used in the rest of this section.
Lemma 7. The maximum of
f
(
{αi}Ti=1
)
= 1−
T∏
i=1
(1− αiAi),
where Ai is positive real, subject to
1 ≤ αi ≤ ci, (here ciAi ≤ 1),
T∏
i=1
αi = c,
is achieved at the point when the cardinality follows the inequality below:
|{i : αi 6= ci and αi 6= 1}| ≤ 1. (8)
Based on Lemma 3, we can prove the following composition theorem for ε-differential privacy as a
preparation theorem of the general case.
Theorem 4 (Composition Theorem IV). Suppose an iterative machine learning algorithm A has T
steps: {Yi(S)}Ti=1. Specifically,Mi : (Yi−1(S), S) 7→ Yi(S) is the i-th iterator. Assume that Y0 is the
initial hypothesis (which does not depend on S). If for any fixed observation yi−1 of the variable Yi−1,
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Mi(yi−1, S) is εi-differentially private, then {Yi(S)}Ti=0 is (ε′, δ′)-differentially private that
ε′ =
√√√√2 log( 1
δ′
)( T∑
i=1
ε2i
)
+
T∑
i=1
εi
eεi − 1
eεi + 1
.
Based on Lemmas 6 and 7, we can prove our composition theorems for (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
We first prove a composition algorithm of (ε, δ)-differential privacy whose estimate of ε′ is somewhat
looser than the existing results.
Theorem 5 (Composition TheoremV). Suppose an iterative machine learning algorithmA has T steps:
{Yi(S)}Ti=1. Specifically, let the i-th iterator be as follows,
Mi : (Yi−1(S), S) 7→ Yi(S). (9)
Assume that Y0 is the initial hypothesis (which does not depend on S). If for any fixed observation yi−1
of the variable Yi−1, Mi(yi−1, S) is (εi, δi)-differentially private (i ≥ 1), then {Yi(S)}Ti=0 is (ε′, δ′)
differentially private with
ε′ =
√√√√2 log(1
δ˜
)( T∑
i=1
ε2i
)
+
T∑
i=1
εi
eεi − 1
eεi + 1
,
δ′ = max
{αi}Ti=1∈I
1−
T∏
i=1
(
1− eαi δi
1 + eεi
)
+ 1−
T∏
i=1
(
1− δi
1 + eεi
)
+ δ˜,
where I is defined as the set of {αi}Ti=1 such that
T∑
i=1
αi = ε
′, |{i : αi 6= εi and αi 6= 0}| ≤ 1.
Then, for any iterative learning algorithm whose i-th iteration is (εi, δi)-differentially private, we
prove there exists an iterative learning algorithm A˜ whose i-th iteration is ε′i-differentially private and
the distance between them is controlled by constants relying on εi and δi measured by D∞(X‖Y ),
Dδ(X‖Y ), and∆(X‖Y ) defined as follows.1
Definition 6 (Max Divergence; cf. [23], Definition 3.6). For any random variables X and Y , the max
divergence betweenX and Y is defined as
D∞(X‖Y ) = max
S⊆Supp(X)
[
log
P(X ∈ S)
P(Y ∈ S)
]
.
Furthermore, the δ-approximate max divergence from X to Y is defined as
Dδ∞(X‖Y ) = max
S⊆Supp(X):P(Y ∈S)≥δ
[
log
P(X ∈ S)− δ
P(Y ∈ S)
]
.
Definition 7 (Statistical Distance; cf. [23]). For any random variablesX and Y , the statistical distance
betweenX and Y is defined as
∆(X‖Y ) = max
S
|P(X ∈ S)− P(Y ∈ S)|.
Based on Theorem 5, we can calculate the (ε′, δ′)-differential privacy of algorithm A˜. Eventually, we
can calculate the (ε, δ)-differential privacy that algorithmA as a weaker version of Theorem 3 in which
1These two pseudo-distances have implicitly close relationships with the "differential loss" (see xxx) and thus helpful in
approximating differential privacy.
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ε′ is replaced by ε2 wherein as follows.
Applying the Chernoff concentration inequality [53] and Theorem 3.5 in [36], we eventually extend
the weaker version to Theorem 3. Theorem 3.5 in [36] relies on a term privacy area defined wherein.
A larger privacy area corresponds to a worse privacy-preservation. In this paper, we make a novel
contribution that proves the moment generating function of the following random variable represents the
worst case,
log
(
P(∩iYi(S) ∈ Bi)
P(∩iYi(S′) ∈ Bi)
)
, (10)
where Yi(S) and Yi(S
′) are the mechanisms achieving the largest privacy area.
4.2.2 Comparison with Existing Results
Our composition theorem is strictly tighter than the existing results. A classic composition theorem
addressing the (ε′, δ′)-differential privacy of an iterative algorithm is as follows (see [23], Theorem 3.20
and Corollary 3.21, pp. 49-52),
ε′ =
T∑
i=1
εi(e
εi − 1) +
√√√√2 log(1
δ
) T∑
i=1
ε2i , δ
′ = δ˜ +
T∑
i=1
δi,
where δ˜ is an arbitrary positive real, (ε′, δ′) is the differential privacy of the whole algorithm, and (εi, δi)
is the differential privacy of the i-th iteration. Both the estimates of ε′ and δ′ are strictly looser than ours:
(1) the estimate of ε′ (eq. 3) is strictly smaller than the ε′3 in our estimate (see eq. 5). Specifically, the
i-th term,
εi (e
εi − 1) /(eεi + 1),
of the series,
T∑
i=1
εi (e
εi − 1) /(eεi + 1),
in our estimate is smaller than the corresponding term by (eεi + 1); and (2) the difference between our
estimate of δ′ and the corresponding term is as follows,
δ
eε − 1
eε + 1
(
T −
⌈
ε′
ε
⌉)
.
Currently, the tightest approximation is as follows [36],
ε′ = min {ε′1, ε′2, ε′3} ,
δ′ = 1− (1− δ)T (1− δ˜).
where
ε′1 = Tε,
ε′2 =
(eε − 1) εT
eε + 1
+ ε
√√√√2T log
(
e +
√
Tε2
δ˜
)
,
ε′3 =
(eε − 1) εT
eε + 1
+ ε
√
2T log
(
1
δ˜
)
.
The estimate of the ǫ′ is the same as ours, while their δ′ is also larger than ours approximately by
δ
eε − 1
eε + 1
(
T −
⌈
ε′
ε
⌉)
.
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In many situations, the number of iterations T is overwhelmingly larger than ⌈ε′/ε⌉, which guarantees
that our advantage is significant.
5 Applications
Our theories apply to a wide spectrum of machine learning algorithms. This section implements them
to two popular regimes as examples: (1) stochastic gradient Langevin dynamics as an example of
the stochastic gradient Monte Carlo scheme [75, 47, 78]; and (2) agnostic federated learning [28, 54]
from the client view. The theories help deliver O(√logN/N) on-average generalization bounds and
O(√logN/N) high-probability generalization bounds for the two schemes. Detailed proofs are given
in Section C.
5.1 Application in SGLD
Bayesian learning aims to obtain the posterior of model parameters of parametric machine learning
models and then approach the best parameter. However, the analytic expression of the posterior is in most
real-world cases. To solve this problem, Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods are employed to
infer the posterior [31, 26, 18]. However, MCMC can be prohibitively time-consuming on large-scale
data. To address this issue, stochastic gradient Markov chain Monte Carlo (SGMCMC; [47]) introduces
stochastic gradient estimate [64] into Bayesian learning. The family of SGMCMC algorithms includes
stochastic gradientLangevindynamics (SGLD; [75]), stochastic gradientRiemannianLangevin dynamics
(SGRLD; [60]), stochastic gradient Fisher scoring (SGFS; [2]), stochastic gradient Hamiltonian Monte
Carlo (SGHMC; [14]), stochastic gradient Nosé-Hoover Thermostat (SGNHT; [17]), etc. SGMCMC has
been applied to many areas, including topic model [43, 79] and Bayesian neural network [46, 66]. This
paper analyses SGLD as an example of the SGMCMC scheme.
An example of SGLD is shown by the following chart.
Algorithm 1 Stochastic Gradient Langevin Dynamics
Require: Samples S = {z1, ...zN}, Gauss noise variance σ, size of mini-batch τ , iteration steps T ,
learning rate {η1, ...ηT }, Regularization function r, Lipschitz constant L of loss l.
1: Initialize θ0 randomly.
2: For t = 1 to T do:
3: Randomly sample a mini-batch B of size τ ;
4: Sample gt fromN (0, σ2I);
5: Update
θt ← θt−1 − ηt
[
1
τ∇r(θt−1) + 1τ
∑
z∈B∇l(z|θt−1) + gt
]
.
The following theorem provides an estimation of the differential privacy and generalization bounds
of SGLD.
Theorem 6. SGLD is (ε′, δ′)-differentially private. The factor ε′ is as follows,
ε′ =
√
8 log
(
1
δ˜
)(
τ2
N2
T ε˜2
)
+ 2T
τ
N
ε˜
e2
τ
N
ε˜ − 1
e2
τ
N
ε˜ + 1
,
and the factor δ′ is as follows,
δ′ =1−
(
1− e2 τN ε˜
τ
N δ
1 + e2
τ
N
ε˜
)⌈Nε′
2τε˜
⌉(
1−
τ
N δ
1 + e2
τ
N
ε˜
)T−⌈Nε′2τε˜ ⌉
+ 1−
(
1−
τ
N δ
1 + e2
τ
N
ε˜
)T
+ e−
ε
′+ τ
N
Tε˜
2
(
1
1 + e
τ
N
ε˜
(
2 τN T ε˜
τ
N T ε˜− ε′
))T ( τ
N ε˜T + ε
′
τ
N T ε˜− ε′
)−Nε′+τTε˜2τε˜
,
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where
ε˜ =
2
√
2Lσ 1τ
√
log 1δ +
4
τ2L
2
2σ2
.
Additionally, an on-average generalization bound and a high-probability bound are delivered combined
with Theorem 1.
Remark 2. Regarding the dependence on the training sample size N , we have
P
[
RˆS(A(S)) ≤ O
(
T√
N
)
+R(A(S))
]
≥ 1−O
(
T√
N
)
.
We further prove that SGLD is PAC-learnable under the following assumption.
Assumption 1. There exist constantsK1 > 0,K2 , T0, andN0, such that, for T > T0 and anyN > N0,
we have
RˆS(A(S)) ≤ exp(−K1T +K2).
This assumption is justified as the training loss can almost surely achieve near-0 in modern machine
learning.
Some existing works have also studied the generalizability and privacy-preservation of SGLD. Wang
et al. [74] prove that SGLD has "privacy for free" without injecting noise. Specifically, the authors
proved that (1) SGLD is (ε, δ)-differentially private if
T >
ε2N
32τ log(2/δ)
;
(2) SGHMC is (ε, δ)-differentially private if
2(A− Bˆ)/ht ≻ 128nTL
2
τε2
log(2/δ)IN ;
and (3) SGHMC is (ε, δ)-differentially private if
2a
ηt
≥ 128NTL
2
τε2
log
(
2NT
τδ
)
log
(
1
δ
)
.
Pensia et al. [61] analyzes the generalizability of SGLD via information theory. Some works also
deliver generalization bounds via algorithmic stability or the PAC-Bayesian framework [30, 63, 55].
5.2 Application in Agnostic Federated Learning
Smart mobile phones continuously collect massive amounts of information including text messages,
GPS records, pictures, etc. The data is highly valuable to the industry but also highly private. This
phenomenon creates the dilemma of how to extract population knowledge while protecting individual
privacy. Federated learning [67, 40, 51, 77] adapts a decentralized regime that does not collect the raw
information collected in the personal terminals to a centralized cloud. Instead, it trains models on the
edge (e.g., mobile phones) or just collect processed data (e.g., noised data). This mechanism sheds light
on solving the dilemma. The following algorithm designed by [28, 54] further enhances the privacy
preservation to protect client identity from differential attacks.
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Algorithm 2 Differentially Private Federated Learning
Require: Clients {c1, ...cN}, Gaussian noise variance σ, size of mini-batch τ , iteration steps T , upper
bound L of the step size.
1: Initialize θ0 randomly.
2: For t = 1 to T do:
3: Randomly sample a mini-batch of clients of size τ ;
4: Randomly sample bt fromN (0, L2σ2I);
5: Central curator distributes θt−1 to the clients in the mini-batch B;
6: Update θt+1 ← θt +
(
1
B
∑
i∈B
ClientUpdate(ci,θt)
max
(
1,
‖hi‖2
L
) + bt
)
.
The following theorem provides an estimation of the differential privacy and generalization bounds
of agnostic federated learning.
Theorem 7 (Differential Privacy and Generalization Bounds of Differentially Private Federated Learn-
ing). Agnostic federated learning is (ε′, δ′)-differentially private. The factor ε′ is as follows,
ε′ =
√
8 log
(
1
δ˜
)(
τ2
N2
Tε2
)
+ 2T
τ
N
ε
e2
τ
N
ε − 1
e2
τ
N
ε + 1
, (11)
and the factor δ′ is defined as follows,
δ′ =1−
(
1− e2 τN ε˜
τ
N δ
1 + e2
τ
N
ε˜
)⌈Nε′
2τε˜
⌉(
1−
τ
N δ
1 + e2
τ
N
ε˜
)T−⌈Nε′2τε˜ ⌉
+ 1−
(
1−
τ
N δ
1 + e2
τ
N
ε˜
)T
+ e−
ε
′+ τ
N
Tε˜
2
(
1
1 + e
τ
N
ε˜
(
2 τN T ε˜
τ
N T ε˜− ε′
))T ( τ
N ε˜T + ε
′
τ
N T ε˜− ε′
)−Nε′+τTε˜2τε˜
,
where
ε˜ =
4σ 1τ
√
log 1δ +
1
τ2
2σ2
.
Additionally, an on-average generalization bound and a high-probability bound are delivered combined
with Theorem 1.
Remark 3. The on-average generalization bound is O(√logN/N) and the high-probability general-
ization bound is O(√logN/N).
6 Conclusion
This paper studies the relationships between generalization and privacy preservation in two steps. We first
establish the generalization-privacy relationship for any machine learning algorithm. Specifically, we
prove a high-probability bound for differentially private learning algorithms based on a novel on-average
generalization bound formulti-database algorithms. This high-probability generalization bound delivers a
PAC-learnable guarantee for differentially private learning algorithms. Then, we prove three composition
theorems that calculate the (ε′, δ′)-differential privacy of an iterative algorithm. By integrating the two
steps, we establish the generalization-privacy relationship of iterative learning algorithms. Compared
with existingworks, our theoretical results are strictly tighter and apply to a wider application domain. We
then use them to study the generalization-privacy relationship in stochastic gradient Langevin dynamics
(SGLD), as an example of the stochastic gradient Markov chain Monte Carlo, and agnostic federated
learning from the client view. We obtain the approximation of differential privacy of SGLD and agnostic
federated learning which further leads to high-probability bounds that do not explicitly rely on the model
size which would be prohibitively large in many deep models.
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A Proofs of Generalization Bounds via Differential Privacy
This appendix collects all the proofs of the generalization bounds. It is organized as follows: (1)Appendix
A.1 proves Theorem 2; and (2) Appendix A.2 proves Theorem 1.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 2. The left side of eq. (2) can be rewritten as
E
~S∼DkN
[
E
A(~S)
[
RˆSi
A(~S)
(
hA(~S)
)]]
= E
~S∼DkN
[
E
A(~S)
[
Ez∼Si
A(~S)
[
l
(
hA(~S), z
)]]]
(∗)
= E
~S∼DkN
[
E
A(~S)
[
E
~z∼~S
[
l
(
hA(~S), ziA(~S)
)]]]
= E
~S∼DkN
[
E
~z∼~S
[
E
A(~S)
[
l
(
hA(~S), ziA(~S)
)]]]
= E
~S∼DkN
[
E
~z∼~S
[
E
A(~S)
[
l
(
hA(~S), ziA(~S)
)]]]
= E
~S∼DkN
[
E
~z∼~S
[∫ 1
0
P
(
l
(
hA(~S), ziA(~S)
)
≤ t
)
dt
]]
= E
~S∼DkN
[
E
~z∼~S
[
k∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
P
(
l
(
hA(~S), zi
)
≤ t, iA(~S) = i
)
dt
]]
,
where ~z in the right side of (∗) is defined as {z1, · · · , zk}, zi is uniformly selected from Si. Since A is
(ε, δ) differentially private, we further have
E
~S∼DkN
[
E
~z∼~S
[
k∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
P
(
l
(
hA(~S), zi
)
≤ t, iA(~S) = i
)
dt
]]
≤ E
~S∼DkN
[
E
~z∼~S,z0∼D
[
k∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
eεP
(
l
(
hA(~Szi:z0), zi
)
≤ t, iA(~Szi:z0) = i
)
+ δ dt
]]
=eε E
~S∼DkN
[
E
~z∼~S,z0∼D
[
k∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
P
(
l
(
hA(~Szi:z0), zi
)
≤ t, iA(~Szi:z0) = i
)
dt
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+ kδ
=
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eε E
~S∼DkN
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E
~z∼~S,z0∼D
[∫ 1
0
P
(
l
(
hA(~Szi:z0), zi
)
≤ t, iA(~Szi:z0) = i
)
dt
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+ kδ
=
k∑
i=1
eε E
~S′∼DkN−1
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E
zi∼D,z0∼D
[∫ 1
0
P
(
l
(
hA(~S′∪{z0}), zi
)
≤ t, iA(~S′∪{z0}) = i
)
dt
]]
+ kδ.
Since ~S′ ∪ {z0} ∼ DkN , let ~S = ~S′ ∪ {z0} and z = zi, we have
k∑
i=1
eε E
~S′∼DkN−1
[
E
zi∼D,z0∼D
[∫ 1
0
P
(
l
(
hA(~S′∪{z0}), zi
)
≤ t, iA(~S′∪{z0}) = i
)
dt
]]
+ kδ
=
k∑
i=1
eε E
~S∼DkN
[
E
z∼D
[∫ 1
0
P
(
l
(
hA(~S), z
)
≤ t, iA(~S) = i
)
dt
]]
+ kδ
=eε E
~S∼DkN
[
E
z∼D
[∫ 1
0
P
(
l
(
hA(~S), z
)
≤ t
)
dt
]]
+ kδ
=eε E
~S∼DkN
[
E
z∼D
[
EA(S)
[
l
(
hA(~S), z
)]]]
+ kδ.
21
Therefore, we have
E
~S∼DkN
[
E
A(~S)
[
RˆSi
A(~S)
(hA(~S))
]]
≤ kδ + eε E
~S∼DkN
[ E
A(~S)
[R
(
hA(~S)
)
]]. (12)
Rearranging eq. (12), we have
e−ε E
~S∼DkN
[
E
A(~S)
[
RˆSi
A(~S)
(hA(~S))
]]
≤ e−εkδ + E
~S∼DkN
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E
A(~S)
[
R
(
hA(~S)
)]]
− E
~S∼DkN
[ E
A(~S)
[R
(
hA(~S)
)
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RˆSi
A(~S)
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,
which leads to
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RˆSi
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~S∼DkN
[ E
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[R
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≤1− e−ε + e−εkδ.
The other side of the inequality can be similarly obtained.
The proof is completed.
A.2 Proofs of Theorem 1
We then prove Lemmas 1 and 2 to prove Theorem 1. The proofs are inspired by [58].
Proof of Lemma 1. By Corollary 1, we have that
E
~S∼DkN
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E
A(~S)
[
RˆSi
A(~S)
(hA(~S))
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≤ e−εkδ + ε+ E
~S∼DkN
[
E
A(~S)
[
R
(
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.
Since RˆSi
A(~S)
(hA(~S)) ≥ 0, we have that for any α > 0,
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.
22
Furthermore, by splitting E
~S∼DkN
[ E
A(~S)
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hA(~S)
)
]] into two parts, we have
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RˆSi
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Let α = e−εkδ + 3ε, we have
P
(
RˆSi
A(~S)
(hA(~S)) ≤ R
(
hA(~S)
)
+ α
)
≤ α− (e
−εkδ + ε)
1 + α
≤ ε.
The proof is completed.
Proof of Lemma 2. Construct algorithm B with input ~S = {Si}ki=1 and T ( where Si, T ∈ ZN ) as
follows:
Step 1. Run A on Si, i = 1, · · · , k. Denote the output as hi = A(Si).
Step 2. Let utility function as q(~S, T, i) = N
(
RˆSi(hi)− RˆT (hi)
)
. Apply exponential mechanism
M(hi, ~S, T ) with differential privacy ε to q and return the output.
We then prove that B satisfies
P
[
l
(
hB(~S), SiB(~S)
)
≤ R
(
hB(~S)
)
+ ke−εδ + 3ε
]
< ε.
By eq. (??), we have that
P
(
∀i, Rˆ(A(Si)) ≤ e−εkδ + 8ǫ+R(A(Si))
)
≤
(
1− e
−εδ
ε
ln
(
2
ǫ
))k
,
which leads to
P
(
∃i, Rˆ(A(Si)) > e−εkδ + 8ǫ+R(A(Si))
)
> 1−
(
1− 1
k
ln
(
2
ǫ
))k
≥ 1− ε
2
. (13)
Furthermore, since T is independent with ~S, by Hoeffding inequality, we have that
P
(
∀i, |l(hi, T )−R(hi)| ≤ ε
2
)
≥ (1− e−ǫ2/2N )k ≥ 1− ε
8
. (14)
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Therefore, combining eq. (13) and eq. (14),
P
(
∃i, Rˆ(A(Si)) > e−εkδ + 15
2
ǫ+ l(hi, T )
)
> 1− 5ε
8
.
Since q has senstivity 1, we have that fixed hi
P
(
M(hi, ~S, T ) ≤ OPT(q(~S, T, i))−Nε)
)
≥ 1− ε
4
,
which leads to
P
(
RˆSi
B(~S)
(hB(~S)) > e
−εkδ +
13
2
ǫ+ RˆT (hB(~S))
)
> 1− 7ε
8
.
Then, using eq. (14) again, we have
P
(
RˆSi
B(~S)
(hB(~S)) > e
−εkδ + 6ǫ+R(hB(~S))
)
> 1− ε.
B Proofs of Composition Theorems
This section proves the composition theorems. It is organized as follows: Section B.1 proves a preparation
lemma on the KL divergence DKL(A(S)‖A(S′)) between the hypotheses A(S) and A(S′); based on
this lemma Section B.2 proves a composition theorem of ε-differential privacy; Section B.3 extends the
composition theorem to (ε, δ)-differential privacy; Section B.4 further tightens the estimate of δ′ under
some assumptions; and Section B.5 analyses the tightness of this estimation.
B.1 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof of Lemma 3. By Lemma 5, we have a random variableM(S) andM(S′), which satisfies
D∞(M(S)‖M(S′)) ≤ ε, D∞(M(S′)‖M(S)) ≤ ε,
and
DKL(A(S)‖A(S′)) ≤ DKL(M(S)‖M(S′)) = DKL(M(S′)‖M(S)). (15)
Therefore, we only need to derive a bound forDKL(M(S)‖M(S′)).
By direct calculation,
DKL(M(S)‖M(S′))
(∗)
=
1
2
[DKL(M(S)‖M(S′)) +DKL(M(S′)‖M(S))]
=
1
2
∫
log
dP(M(S))
dP(M(S′))
dP(M(S)) +
1
2
∫
log
dP(M(S′))
dP(M(S))
dP(M(S′))
=
1
2
∫
log
dP(M(S))
dP(M(S′))
d [P(M(S))− P(M(S′))]
+
1
2
∫ (
log
dP(M(S′))
dP(M(S))
+ log
dP(M(S))
dP(M(S′))
)
dP(M(S′))
=
1
2
∫
log
dP(M(S))
dP(M(S′))
d [P(M(S))− P(M(S′))] + 1
2
∫
log 1 dP(M(S′))
=
1
2
∫
log
dP(M(S))
dP(M(S′))
d [P(M(S))− P(M(S′))] , (16)
where eq. (∗) comes from eq. (15).
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We now analyse the last integration in eq. (16). Define
k(y)
△
=
dP(M(S) = y)
dP(M(S′) = y)
− 1. (17)
Therefore,
k(y)dP(M(S′) = y) = dP(M(S) = y)− dP(M(S′) = y). (18)
Additionally,
EM(S′)k(M(S
′) =
∫
y∈H
k(y)dP(M(S′) = y)
=
∫
y∈H
d (P(M(S) = y)− dP(M(S′) = y))
=0. (19)
By calculating the integration of the both sides of eq. (18), we have∫
k(y)dP(M(S′) = y) = 0.
Also, combined with the definition of k(y) (see eq. 17), the right-hand side (RHS) of eq. (16)
becomes
RHS = EM(S′)k(M(S
′)) log(k(M(S′)) + 1). (20)
SinceM is ε-differentially private, k(y) is bounded from both sides as follows,
e−ε − 1 ≤ k(y) ≤ eε − 1. (21)
We now calculate the maximum of eq. (20) subject to eqs. (19) and (21).
First, we argue that the maximum is achieved when k(M(S′)) ∈ {e−ε − 1, eε − 1} with probability
1 (almost surely). When k(M(S′)) ∈ {e−ε − 1, eε − 1}, almost surely, the distribution for k(M(S′)) is
as following,
P
∗(k(M(S′)) = eε − 1) = 1
1 + eε
,
P
∗(k(M(S′)) = e−ε − 1) = e
ε
1 + eε
.
We argue that it is the distribution that maximizes k(M(S′)).
For the brevity, we denote the probability measure for a given distribution Q as PQ. Similarly, P
∗
corresponds the distribution Q∗. We prove that Q∗ maximizes eq. (20) in the following two cases: (1)
PQ(k(M(S
′)) ≥ 0) ≤ P∗(k(M(S′)) = eε−1), and (2) PQ(k(M(S′)) ≥ 0) > P∗(k(M(S′)) = eε−1)
Case 1: PQ(k(M(S
′)) ≥ 0) ≤ P∗(k(M(S′)) = eε − 1)
We have
EM(S′)∼Q∗(k(M(S′) log(k(M(S′)) + 1))
=P∗(k(M(S′)) = eε − 1) · ε(eε − 1)− P∗(k(M(S′)) = e−ε − 1) · ε(e−ε − 1)
=(P∗(k(M(S′)) = eε − 1)− PQ(k(M(S′)) ≥ 0)) · ε(eε − 1)
+ PQ(k(M(S
′)) ≥ 0) · ε(eε − 1)− P∗(k(M(S′)) = e−ε − 1) · ε(e−ε − 1)
≥PQ(k(M(S′)) ≥ 0) · ε(1− e−ε)− P∗(k(M(S′)) = e−ε − 1) · ε(1− e−ε)
+ PQ(k(M(S
′)) ≥ 0) · ε(eε − 1)− P∗(k(M(S′)) = e−ε − 1) · ε(e−ε − 1).
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Note that
PQ(k(M(S
′)) < 0) =P∗(k(M(S′)) = eε − 1)− PQ(k(M(S′)) ≥ 0)
+ P∗(k(M(S′)) = e−ε − 1).
Therefore, together with the condition eq. (21),
EM(S′)∼Q(k(M(S
′) log(k(M(S′)) + 1)Ik(M(S′)≤0))
≤(P∗(k(M(S′)) = eε − 1)− PQ(k(M(S′)) ≥ 0)) · ε(1− e−ε)
+ P∗(k(M(S′)) = e−ε − 1) · ε(1− e−ε). (22)
Also,
EM(S′)∼Q(k(M(S
′) log(k(M(S′)) + 1)Ik(M(S′))>0) ≤ PQ(k(M(S′)) ≥ 0) · ε(eε − 1). (23)
Therefore, combined inequalities eqs. (22) and (23), we have
EM(S′)∼Q(k(M(S′) log(k(M(S′)) + 1)) ≤ EM(S′)∼Q∗(k(M(S′) log(k(M(S′)) + 1)).
Since the distributionQ is arbitrary, the distributionQ∗ maximizes the k(M(S′) log(k(M(S′))+1).
Case 2: PQ(k(M(S
′)) ≥ 0) > P∗(k(M(S′)) = eε − 1)
We first prove that if PQ(1− e−ε < k(M(S′)) < 0) 6= 0, there exists a distributionQ′ such that
PQ′(k(M(S
′)) ≥ 0) = PQ(k(M(S′)) ≥ 0),
PQ′(k(M(S
′)) < 0) = PQ(k(M(S′)) < 0),
PQ′(k(M(S
′)) < 0) = PQ′(k(M(S′) = e−ε − 1),
EQ′(k(M(S
′) log(k(M(S′)) + 1)) > EQ′(k(M(S′) log(k(M(S′)) + 1)),
while the two conditions (eqs. 19, 21) still hold.
Additionally, we have assumed that
PQ(k(M(S
′)) ≥ 0) > P∗(k(M(S′)) = eε − 1).
Therefore,
PQ(k(M(S
′)) ≤ 0) < P∗(k(M(S′)) = e−ε − 1).
Also, since the distributionQ′ is arbitrary, let it satisfy
PQ′(k(M(S
′)) < 0) = PQ(k(M(S′)) < 0) = PQ′(k(M(S′) = e−ε − 1).
Then, in order to meet the condition eq. (19), let
PQ′(k(M(S
′) = eε − 1) > PQ(k(M(S′) = eε − 1),
and
PQ′(0 < k(M(S
′)) < eε − 1) ≤ PQ(0 < k(M(S′)) < eε − 1),
Since x log(x+ 1) increases when x > 0 and decreases when x < 0, we have
EQ′(k(M(S
′) log(k(M(S′)) + 1)) > EQ(k(M(S′) log(k(M(S′)) + 1)).
Therefore, we have proved that the argumentwhenPQ(k(M(S
′)) < 0) 6= PQ(k(M(S′)) = e−ε−1).
We now prove the case that
PQ(k(M(S
′)) < 0) = PQ(k(M(S′)) = e−ε − 1),
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where
EQ(k(M(S
′) log(k(M(S′)) + 1)Ik(M(S′))<0) = ε(1− e−ε)PQ(k(M(S′)) < 0).
Applying Jensen’s inequality to bound the EQ(k(M(S
′) log(k(M(S′)) + 1)Ik(M(S′))≥0), we have
EQ(k(M(S
′)) log(k(M(S′)) + 1)Ik(M(S′))≥0)
=PQ(M(S
′) ≥ 0)EQ′(k(M(S′)) log(k(M(S′)) + 1)|k(M(S′)) ≥ 0)
(∗)
≤PQ(M(S′) ≥ 0)EQ (k(M(S′))|k(M(S′)) ≥ 0) · log(EQ (k(M(S′))|k(M(S′)) ≥ 0) + 1), (24)
where the inequality (∗) uses Jensen’s inequality (x log(1 + x) is convex with respect to x when x > 0).
The upper bound in eq. (24) is achieved as long as
PQ(k(M(S
′)) ≥ 0) = PQ(k(M(S′)) = EQ(k(M(S′))|k(M(S′)) ≥ 0)).
Furthermore,
PQ(k(M(S
′)) < 0) = PQ(k(M(S′)) = e−ε − 1).
Therefore, the distributionQ is determined by the cumulative density functions PQ(k(M(S
′)) < 0)
and PQ(k(M(S
′)) ≥ 0).
Hence, maximizing EQ(k(M(S
′) log(k(M(S′)) + 1)) is equivalent to maximizing the following
object function,
g(q) = q(1− e−ε) log eε + (1− q) q
1 − q (1− e
−ε) log
(
q
1− q (1 − e
−ε) + 1
)
,
subject to
q
1− q ≤ e
ε, (25)
where g(q) is the maximum of eq. (20) subject to PQ(k(M(S
′)) < 0) = q, and the condition eq. (25)
comes from the PQ(k(M(S
′)) ≥ 0) > P∗(k(M(S′)) = eε − 1) (the assumption of Case 2).
Additionally, g(q) can be represented as follows,
q(1− e−ε) log
(
q
1− q (e
ε − 1) + ε
)
.
Since both q and q1−q monotonously increase, g(q)monotonously increases. Therefore,Q
∗maximize
eq. (20), which finishes the proof.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Based on Lemma 3, we can prove the following composition theorem for ε-differential privacy as a
preparation theorem of the general case.
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Proof of Theorem 4. We begin by calculating log
P({Yi(S)=yi}Ti=0)
P({Yi(S′)=yi}Ti=0)
as follows,
log
P
(
{Yi(S) = yi}Ti=0
)
P
(
{Yi(S′) = yi}Ti=0
)
= log
(
T∏
i=0
P (Yi(S) = yi|Yi−1(S) = yi−1, ..., Y0(S) = y0)
P (Yi(S′) = yi|Yi−1(S′) = yi−1, ..., Y0(S′) = y0)
)
=
T∑
i=0
log
(
P (Yi(S) = yi|Yi−1(S) = yi−1, ..., Y0(S) = y0)
P (Yi(S′) = yi|Yi−1(S′) = yi−1, ..., Y0(S′) = y0)
)
(∗)
=
T∑
i=1
log
(
P (Yi(S) = yi|Yi−1(S) = yi−1, ..., Y0(S) = y0)
P (Yi(S′) = yi|Yi−1(S′) = yi−1, ..., Y0(S′) = y0)
)
=
T∑
i=1
log
(
P (Mi(yi−1, S) = yi|Yi−1(S) = yi−1, ..., Y0(S) = y0)
P (Mi(yi−1, S′) = yi|Yi−1(S′) = yi−1, ..., Y0(S′) = y0)
)
(∗∗)
=
T∑
i=1
log
(
P (Mi(yi−1, S) = yi)
P (Mi(yi−1, S′) = yi)
)
,
where eq. (∗) comes from the independence of Y0 with respect to S and eq. (∗∗) is because the
independence ofMi to Yk (k < i) when the Yi−1 is fixed.
By the definition of ε-differential privacy, one has for arbitrary yi−1 as the observation of Yi−1,
D∞ (Mi(yi−1, S)‖Mi(yi−1, S′)) < εi,
D∞ (Mi(yi−1, S′)‖Mi(yi−1, S)) < εi.
Thus, by Lemma 3, we have that
E
(
log
(
P (Mi(Yi−1, S) = Yi)
P (Mi(Yi−1, S′) = Yi)
) ∣∣∣Yi−1(S) = yi−1, ..., Y0(S) = y0
)
=DKL(Mi(yi−1, S)‖Mi(yi−1, S′))
≤εi e
εi − 1
eεi + 1
. (26)
Combining Azuma Lemma (Lemma 4), eq. (26) derives the following equation
P

{Yi(S) = yi}Ti=0 : P
(
{Yi(S) = yi}Ti=0
)
P
(
{Yi(S′) = yi}Ti=0
) > eε′

 < δ′,
where S and S′ are neighbour sample sets.
Therefore, the algorithmA is ε′-differentially private.
The proof is completed.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 5
Now, we can prove our composition theorems for (ε, δ)-differential privacy. We first prove a composition
algorithm of (ε, δ)-differential privacy whose estimate of ε′ is somewhat looser than the existing results.
Then, we tighten the results and obtain a composition theorem that strictly tighter than the current
estimate.
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Proof of Theorem 5. It has been proved that the optimal privacy preservation can be achieved by a
sequence of independent iterations (see [36], Theorem 3.5). Therefore, without loss of generality, we
assume that the iterations in our theorem are independent with each other.
Rewrite Yi(S) as Y
0
i , and Yi(S
′) as Y 1i (i ≥ 1). Then, by Lemma 6, there exist random variables Y˜ 0i
and Y˜ 1i , such that
∆
(
Y 0i ‖Y˜ 0i
)
≤ δi
1 + eεi
, (27)
∆
(
Y 1i ‖Y˜ 1i
)
≤ δi
1 + eεi
, (28)
D∞
(
Y˜ 0i ‖Y˜ 1i
)
≤εi, (29)
D∞
(
Y˜ 1i ‖Y˜ 0i
)
≤εi. (30)
Applying Theorem 5 (here, δ = δ˜), we have that
Dδ˜∞
(
{Y˜ 0i }Ti=0‖{Y˜ 1i }Ti=0
)
≤ ε′,
Dδ˜∞
(
{Y˜ 1i }Ti=0‖{Y˜ 0i }Ti=0
)
≤ ε′.
Apparently,
P(Y 0i ∈ Bi)−min
{
δi
1 + eεi
,P(Y 0i ∈ Bi)
}
≥ 0.
Therefore, for any sequence of hypothesis sets B0, · · · , BT ,
P(Y 00 ∈ B0)
(
P(Y 01 ∈ B1)−min
{
δ1
1 + eε1
,P(Y 01 ∈ B1)
})
· · ·
(
P(Y 0T ∈ BT )−min
{
δT
1 + eεT
,P(Y 0T ∈ B1)
})
≤P(Y˜ 00 ∈ B0) · · ·P(Y˜ 0T ∈ BT )
≤eε′P(Y˜ 10 ∈ B0) · · ·P(Y˜ 1T ∈ BT ) + δ˜. (31)
Furthermore, by eq. (30), we also have that
P(Y˜ 0i ∈ Bi) ≤ min
{
eεi ,
1
P(Y˜ 1i ∈ Bi)
}
P(Y˜ 1i ∈ Bi).
Therefore,
P(Y˜ 00 ∈ B0) · · ·P(Y˜ 0n ∈ BT ) ≤
T∏
i=1
min
{
eεi ,
1
P(Y˜ 1i ∈ Bi)
}
P(Y˜ 10 ∈ B0) · · ·P(Y˜ 1T ∈ BT ) + δ˜.
Then, we prove this theorem in two cases: (1)
∏T
i=1 min
{
e
εi , 1
P(Y˜1
i
∈Bi)
}
≤ eε′ ; and (2)∏
T
i=1min
{
e
εi , 1
P(Y˜1
i
∈Bi)
}
> eε
′
.
Case 1-
∏T
i=1 min
{
e
εi , 1
P(Y˜1
i
∈Bi)
}
≤ eε′ .
We have that
P(Y˜ 10 ∈ B0)
(
P(Y˜ 11 ∈ B1)−
δ1
1 + eε1
)
· · ·
(
P(Y˜ 1T ∈ BT )−
δT
1 + eεT
)
≤P(Y 10 ∈ B0) · · ·P(Y 1T ∈ BT ).
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By simple calculation, we have that
T∏
i=1
min
{
eεi ,
1
P(Y˜ 1i ∈ Bi)
}
P(Y˜ 10 ∈ B0) · · ·P(Y˜ 1T ∈ BT )
≤
T∏
i=1
min
{
eεi ,
1
P(Y˜ 1i ∈ Bi)
}
P(Y 10 ∈ B0) · · ·P(Y 1T ∈ BT )
+
T∏
i=1
min
{
eεi ,
1
P(Y˜ 1i ∈ Bi)
}
P(Y˜ 10 ∈ B0) · · ·P(Y˜ 1T ∈ BT )
−
n∏
i=1
min
{
eεi ,
1
P(Y˜ 1i ∈ Bi)
}
P(Y˜ 10 ∈ B0)(
P(Y˜ 11 ∈ B1)−
δ1
1 + eε1
)
· · ·
(
P(Y˜ 1T ∈ BT )−
δT
1 + eεT
)
.
Apparently,
min
{
eεi ,
1
P(Y˜ 1i ∈ Bi)
}
P(Y˜ i0 ∈ Bi) ≤ 1,
and when A > B, f(x) = Ax − (x− a)B increases when x increases.
Therefore, we have that
T∏
i=1
min
{
eεi ,
1
P(Y˜ 1i ∈ Bi)
}
P(Y˜ 10 ∈ B0) · · ·P(Y˜ 1T ∈ BT )
−
T∏
i=1
min
{
eεi ,
1
P(Y˜ 1i ∈ Bi)
}
P (Y˜ 10 ∈ B0)(
P(Y˜ 11 ∈ B1)−
δ1
1 + eε1
)
· · ·
(
P(Y˜ 1T ∈ BT )−
δT
1 + eεT
)
≤1−
T∏
i=1
(
1−min
{
eεi ,
1
P(Y˜ 1i ∈ Bi)
}
δi
1 + eεi
)
.
Combining with eq. (31), we have that
δ′ ≤ 1−
T∏
i=1
(
1−min
{
eεi ,
1
P(Y˜ 1i ∈ Bi)
}
δi
1 + eεi
)
+ 1−
T∏
i=1
(
1− δi
1 + eεi
)
+ δ˜.
Case 2-
∏T
i=1 min
{
e
εi , 1
P(Y˜1
i
∈Bi)
}
> eε
′
:
There exists a sequence of reals {αi}Ti=1 such that
eαi ≤ min
{
eεi ,
1
P(Y˜ 1i ∈ Bi)
}
,
T∑
i=1
αi = ε
′.
Therefore, similar to Case 1, we have that
δ′ ≤ 1−
T∏
i=1
(
1− eαi δi
1 + eεi
)
+ 1−
T∏
i=1
(
1− δi
1 + eεi
)
.
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Overall, we have proven that
δ′ ≤ 1−
T∏
i=1
(
1− eαi δi
1 + eεi
)
+ 1−
T∏
i=1
(
1− δi
1 + eεi
)
,
where
∑T
i=1 αi ≤ ε′ and αi ≤ εi.
From Lemma 7, the minimum is realised on the boundary, which is exactly this theorem claims.
The proof is completed.
Then, we can prove prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. Applying Theorem 3.5 in [36] and replacing ε′ in the proof of Theorem 5 as
ε′ = min {I1, I2, I3} ,
where
I1 =
T∑
i=1
εi,
I2 =
T∑
i=1
(eεi − 1) εi
eεi + 1
+
√√√√√ T∑
i=1
2ε2i log

e+
√∑T
i=1 ε
2
i
δ˜

,
I3 =
T∑
i=1
(eεi − 1) εi
eεi + 1
+
√√√√ T∑
i=1
2ε2i log
(
1
δ˜
)
The proof is completed.
B.4 Proof of Corollary 3
Proof of Corollary 3. Let P0 and P1 be two distributions whose cumulative distribution functions P0
and P1 are respectively defined as following:
P0(x) =


δ , x = 0
(1− δ)eε
1 + eε
, x = 1
1− δ
1 + eε
, x = 2
0 , x = 3
,
and
P1(x) =


0 , x = 0
(1− δ)eε
1 + eε
, x = 1
1− δ
1 + eε
, x = 2
δ , x = 3
.
By Theorem 3.4 of [36], the largest magnitude of the (ε′, δ′)-differential privacy can be calculated
from the PT0 and PT1 .
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Construct P˜0 and P˜1, whose cumulative distribution functions are as follows,
P˜0(x) =


eεδ
1 + eε
, x = 0
(1− δ)eε
1 + eε
, x = 1
1− δ
1 + eε
, x = 2
δ
1 + eε
, x = 3
,
and
P˜1(x)


δ
1 + eε
, x = 0
(1− δ)eε
1 + eε
, x = 1
1− δ
1 + eε
, x = 2
eεδ
1 + eε
, x = 3
.
One can easily verify that
∆(P0‖P˜0) ≤ δ
1 + eε
,
∆(P1‖P˜1) ≤ δ
1 + eε
,
D∞(P˜0‖P˜1) ≤ ε,
D∞(P˜1‖P˜0) ≤ εi.
Let Vi(xi) = log
(
P˜0(xi)
P˜1(xi)
)
and S(x1, · · · , xT ) =
∑T
i=1 Vi(xi).
We have that for any t > 0,
PP˜T0 ({xi} : S({xi}) > ε
′) ≤ e−ε′tEP˜T0 (e
tS)
= e−ε
′t
(
etε+ε
1 + eε
+
e−tε
1 + eε
)T
= e−ε
′t−Ttε
(
e2tε+ε
1 + eε
+
1
1 + eε
)T
. (32)
By calculating the derivative„ we have that the minimum of the RHS of eq. (32) is achieved at
e2εt = e−ε
Tε+ ε′
Tε− ε′ . (33)
Since ε′ ≥ T eε−1eε+1 ,
e−ε
Tε+ ε′
Tε− ε′ > 1.
Therefore, by applying eq.(33) into the RHS of eq. (32), we have that
PP˜T0 ({xi} : S({xi}) > ε
′) ≤ e− ε
′+Tε
2
(
1
1 + eε
(
2Tε
Tε− ε′
))T (
Tε+ ε′
Tε− ε′
)− ε′+Tε2ε
. (34)
Define RHS of eq. (34) as δ′. We have (P˜b)T (b = 0, 1) is (ε′,δ′)-differentially private. Then, using
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similar analysis of the Proof of Theorem 5, we prove this theorem.
B.5 Tightness of Theorem 3
This section analyses the tightness of Theorem 3. Specifically, we compare it with our Theorem 3.
In the proof of Theorem 3 (see Section B.2), ε′3 is derived through Azuma Lemma (Lemma 4).
Specifically, the δ′ is derived by
P
[
ST ≥ ε′ − T e
ε − 1
eε + 1
]
≤ e−t(ε′−T e
ε−1
eε+1 )E
[
etST
]
= e−t(ǫ
′−T eε−1
eε+1 )E
[
etST−1E
[
etVT |Y1(S), . . . , YT−1(S)
]]
≤ e−t(ǫ′−T e
ε−1
eε+1 )E
[
etST−1
]
e4t
2ε2/8
≤ e−t(ǫ′−T e
ε−1
eε+1 )eTt
2ε2/2,
whereVi is defined as log
P(Yi(S))
P(Yi(S′))
−E
[
log P(Yi(S))
P(Yi(S′))
|Y1(S), . . . , Yi−1(S)
]
andSj is defined as
∑j
i=1 Vi.
Since P
[
ST ≥ ε′ − T eε−1eε+1
]
does not depend on t,
P
[
ST ≥ ε′ − T e
ε − 1
eε + 1
]
≤ min
t>0
e−
(ǫ′−T e
ε−1
eε+1
)2
2Tε2 = δ′,
By contrary, the approach here directly calculates E[etST ], without the shrinkage in the proof of
Theorem 3 (see Section B.2). Specifically,
e−ε
′t−Ttε
(
e2tε+ε
1 + eε
+
1
1 + eε
)T
=e−tǫE
[
etST
]
≤e−t(ǫ′−T e
ε−1
eε+1 )eTt
2ε2/2.
Therefore,
min
t>0
e−ε
′t−Ttε
(
e2tε+ε
1 + eε
+
1
1 + eε
)T
≤ min
t>0
e−t(ǫ
′−T eε−1
eε+1 )eTt
2ε2/2,
which leads to
e−
ε
′+Tε
2
(
1
1 + eε
(
2Tε
Tε− ε′
))T (
Tε+ ε′
Tε− ε′
)− ε′+Tε2ε
≤ δ′.
It ensures that this estimate further tightens δ′ than Section B.2 (which is also the δ˜ in Theorem 3) if the
ε′ is the same.
C Applications
This appendix collects the proofs for the applications in SGLD and federated learning.
C.1 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof of Theorem 6. We first calculate the differential privacy of each step. Assume mini-batch B has
been selected and define∇RˆτS(θ) as following:
∇RˆτS(θ) = ∇r(θ) +
∑
z∈B
∇l(z|θ).
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For any two neighboring sample sets S and S′ and fixed θi−1, we have
max
θi
p(θSi = θi|θSi−1 = θi−1)
p(θS
′
i = θi|θS′i−1 = θi−1)
= max
θi
p(ηi(− 1τ∇RˆτS(θi−1) +N (0, σ2I)) = θi − θi−1)
p(ηi(− 1τ∇RˆτS′ (θi−1) +N (0, σ2I)) = θi − θi−1)
= max
θ′
i
p(ηi(− 1τ∇RˆτS(θi−1) +N (0, σ2I)) = θ′i)
p(ηi(− 1τ∇RˆτS′ (θi−1) +N (0, σ2I)) = θ′i)
.
Define
D(θ′) = log
p(− 1τ∇RˆτS(θi−1) +N (0, σ2I) = θ′)
p(− 1τ∇RˆτS′(θi−1) +N (0, σ2I) = θ′)
,
where θ′ = 1ηi θ
′
i obeys− 1τ∇RˆτS(θi−1) +N (0, σ2I).
Let θ′′ = θ′ + 1τ∇RˆτS(θi−1) and rewriteD(θ′) as:
D(θ′) = log
e−
‖θ′+ 1
τ
∇Rˆτ
S
(θi−1))‖
2
2σ2
e−
‖θ′+ 1
τ
∇Rˆτ
S′
(θi−1)‖
2
2σ2
=− ‖θ
′ + 1τ∇RˆτS(θi−1))‖2
2σ2
+
‖θ′ + 1τ∇RˆτS′(θi−1)‖2
2σ2
=− ‖θ
′′‖2
2σ2
+
‖θ′′ + 1τ∇RˆτS′(θi−1)− 1τ∇RˆτS(θi−1))‖2
2σ2
=
2θ′′T 1τ (∇RˆτS′(θi−1)−∇RˆτS(θi−1)) + 1τ2 (‖∇RˆτS′(θi−1)−∇RˆτS(θi−1)‖2)
2σ2
.
Define∇RˆτS′(θi−1)−∇RˆτS(θi−1) as v. By definition of L, we have that
‖v‖ < 2L.
Therefore, since θ′′Tv ∼ N (0, ‖v‖2σ2), by Chernoff Bound technique,
P
(
θ′′Tv ≥ 2
√
2Lσ
√
log
1
δ
)
≤ P
(
θ′′Tv ≥
√
2‖v‖σ
√
log
1
δ
)
≤ min
t
e−
√
2t‖v‖σ
√
log 1
δE(etθ
′′T
v)
= δ.
Therefore, with probability at least 1− δ with respect to θ′, we have that
D(θ′) ≤
2
√
2Lσ 1τ
√
log 1δ +
4
τ2L
2
2σ2
.
Define ε =
2
√
2Lσ 1
τ
√
log 1
δ
+ 4
τ2
L2
2σ2 . ApplyingLemma4.4 in [8], wehave that the iteration− 1τ∇RˆτS(θi−1)+N (0, σ2I) is (2 τN ε, τN δ)-differentially private. Applying Theorem 3 and
ε′ =
√
8 log
(
1
δ˜
)(
τ2
N2
Tε2
)
+ 2T
τ
N
ε
e2
τ
N
ε − 1
e2
τ
N
ε + 1
,
we can prove the differential privacy.
Letting B sampled randomly and applying Theorem 1, we can prove the generalization bound.
The proof is completed.
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C.2 Proof of Theorem 7
We only need to prove differential privacy part of Theorem 7, and the rest of the proof is similar with the
one of Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 7. The proof bears resemblance to the proof of Theorem 6. One only has to notice
that each update is still a Gauss mechanism, while∥∥∥∥∥ h
t
i
max(1,
‖ht
i
‖2
L )
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ L.
Then, in this situation,D(θ′) is as follows:
D(θ′) = log
p
(
1
τ
( ∑
ck∈B
ht
i
max(1,
‖ht
i
‖2
L
)
)
+N (0, L2σ2I) = θ′
)
p
(
1
τ
( ∑
ck∈B
ht
i
max(1,
‖ht
i
‖2
L
)
)
+N (0, L2σ2I) = θ′
) .
All other reasoning is the same as the previous proof.
By Theorem 3 and
ε′ =
√
8 log
(
1
δ˜
)(
τ2
N2
Tε2
)
+ 2T
τ
N
ε
e2
τ
N
ε − 1
e2
τ
N
ε + 1
,
we can calculate the differential privacy of federated learning.
The proof is completed.
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